The National Audit Office congratulated the efficiency of deploying some 46,000
service men and women to Iraq to fight within Operation Iraqi Freedom
spearheaded by the US, but was highly critical of the situation the
troops found themselves in while doing so.
While the Army's SA80 A2 assault rifle and Challenger II tanks were
reported
to have performed well, some of the tanks were only fitted with the necessary
desert battle army hours before they went into battle. Some tanks and other
armoured vehicles were lacking the nuclear, biological and chemical protection
which was meant to have been fitted.
Likewise, NBC suits for many troops never materialised, nor did normal desert
uniforms and boots. Of that which did arrive, a large quantity was of the
wrong size and didn't fit.
Gas masks did not fit as well as they were meant to, there was a shortfall
in the number of Nerve Agent detectors, and the entire stock of Residual Vapour
Detectors, necessary to let troops know the air was clear after any
chemical attack, was non-functional.
Not the ideal situation for troops who are about to open up a front-line
against an enemy which was widely believed to be just a hare's breath away
from launching chemical or biological attacks.
It is not surprising that the situation hit UK troop morale hard. The NAO
report that the typical front-line view was; "We're out here fighting and you
can't be bothered to buy us a proper uniform".
With the supply chain swamped, many troops and army units simply took every
opportunity to take whatever they needed from wherever they could find it,
leading to misappropriation and further logistical chaos.
Some army units even sent teams back to the UK to see if they could rustle-up
the necessary equipment they needed.
The NAO says the problems were compounded by pressure from the Treasury to
keep costs down which led to the Ministry of Defence only keeping limited stock
of equipment. When it became clear that troops would be committed to the War on
Iraq, manufacturers were given precious little time in which to deliver the
necessary items.
The Ministry of Defence has also independantly highlighted problems of its
own, in particular problems with Communications and Information Systems
having poor intetgration and bottle-necks in information flow which placed
a considerable burden upon army units operations.
Very little of the Enhanced Combat Body Armour that was menat to go to all
troops actually actually existed. The Ministry of Defence admits that some
units were not combat ready when deployed.
The NAO says that the failures should be seen in the wider context of the
operation, which, as a whole, were to be seen as being successful; "The scale
and speed with which the operation was carried out are both extremely
impressive".
They were not however as praising about the situation after the initial days
of the war, when the coalition took control of Iraq as an occupying force. "Our
experience from the field visit to Iraq was that the government had not
fully appreciated the consequences of a total collapse of the Saddam regime and
what the UK's obligations would be once hostilities ceased", the report
states.
So in a nutshell; getting troops into Iraq was a job well done. Not getting the
necessary equipment they needed was a complete cock-up. And, no one had any
post-victory plans for the troops.
The difficulty in moving many thousand troops to the theatre of war can be well
appreciated by anyone who has taken a family away for a weekend holiday, and we
all know that getting there is much easier if you take nothing with you, but
that is not acceptable for going into battle. Getting there is only half the
story.
In hindsight, it looks like the British Army got off lightly, and as they did,
it is tempting to brush the failures under the carpet and concentrate on what
did work well, but consequences could have been very different.
Had Saddam's forces used the chemical and biological weapons they were
suspected of having, it would have been against British forces who were
poorly equipped to have dealt with their use. British casualties
could have been high, and horrific.
Whether the British Army should have been in Iraq in the first place is a matter
which is still subject to much debate, but there is universal agreement that we
must give our troops everything they need to fight their battles and to protect
their lives while doing so.
If we fail to protect our troops in time of war, then we are risking sending
them in for slaughter. That is not acceptable to the public and it is something
which should not be acceptable to the government.
A failure to protect our troops shows nothing but disrespect for the job they
do and casts doubts upon the worthiness of their lives. Jeopardising the
lives of troops and crushing their morale leaves us all in danger.
The government will no doubt seize upon the parts of the report which detail
the success stories, but there are many lessons which the government has to
learn.
The Great British Army Overhaul
Coinciding with the release of the National Audit Office's review of the
British Army's involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the Ministry of
Defences own reflective report, the UK's Minister of Defence has detailed
plans to overhaul the British Army.The Army is to be re-alligned to deal with the threats which Britain faces in
the modern day, not least the threats from terrorism, and the need to shift
from monolithic army operations to smaller more suitable forces.
The Minsiter of Defence, Geoff Hoon, detailed the gist of the proposed changes
saying that, historically, military capability was measured in weight of
numbers and equipment, but in the modern world it would be measured in terms of
an ability to act quickly accurately and decisively.
Completely neglecting to notice that it is not the ability of British Army to
get to the place it needs to be, and ready to act, but having the equipment it
needs to do the job it is tasked with.
